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1. Introduction
Like firms, colleges and universities offer services for a price and com-
pete with each other in both input and output markets. In governance
respects, however, academic institutions often resemble governments
more than commercial enterprises, with faculty exercising democratic
control over a range of significant decisions. Despite the importance of
higher education as an industry, and perennial policy clashes over the
appropriate role of faculty in university decision making, differences
in the governance of firms and universities—and in the extent of
democratic decision making within academic institutions themselves—
have received remarkably little systematic attention. What research has
been done—mainly by historians and sociologists—has been mostly
descriptive or normative. A positive analysis of how colleges and
universities allocate authority stands to further our understanding of the
organization of academic institutions and may also offer insights into
the functions and limitations of democratic decision making in political
and commercial entities more generally.
The analysis here draws on recent theories of political governance
that view the establishment of credible commitments, as opposed to
preference aggregation in the tradition of Arrow (1963), as the principal
function of political institutions generally and of democratic governance
in particular (see Alt and Schepsle, 1990; Miller, 1997, for overviews). The
central premise of this perspective is that, like economic transactions,
political bargains aim to create joint surpluses but are subject to reneging
or appropriation hazards that can prevent deals from being reached or
otherwise result in inefficient outcomes. According to this theory, consti-
tutionally prescribed democratic decision rules enhance confidence in
governmental policies relative to autocracy (i) by broadening the inter-
ests of the government—democratic governments are less likely than
autocratic ones to infringe individual property and political interests
to the extent those interests are represented in legislatures (North and
Weingast, 1989; McGuire and Olson, 1996)—and (ii) by defining and
communicating limits on decision-making authority in ways that help
to make those limits self-enforcing (e.g., Hardin, 1989; Weingast, 1993;
Kandori, 1992a).
This paper extends this conception of the problem of political orga-
nization to academic transactions, beginning with the observation that
individuals who interact with or within academic institutions—faculty,
administrators, students, alumni, and private and public donors, among
others—also face numerous opportunities for mutually advantageous
trade and cooperation and that, like their commercial and political coun-
terparts, such transactions often entail promises of future performance
or rewards in exchange for current actions and investments. To the
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extent such promises are difficult to secure contractually, governance
arrangements that enhance confidence in the performance of academic
bargains should reduce the potential for costly conflict and increase the
willingness of parties to enter such transactions. Of course, democratic
decision making also has its drawbacks, and we should therefore expect
the governance of academic institutions to vary with the nature and
circumstances of the transactions.
Higher education provides a particularly appealing setting
for evaluating theories of democratic governance for several rea-
sons. First and foremost, colleges and universities exhibit a wider
range of decision structures than do conventional firms: Whereas
the archetypical business firm is run autocratically, with formal
authority over the organization’s operations concentrated in the
owner (or owners’ agent), the predominant modes of academic
governance—administrator determination, faculty determination, and
joint administrator–faculty determination—span the three main cate-
gories of political governance—autocracy (monarchy or dictatorship),
unified (or parliamentary) democracy, and divided (or presidential)
democracy. At the same time, educational institutions, as “producers”
in a specific industry, serve a narrower (and analytically more tractable)
range of interests and may also be more susceptible to competitive
pressures than are nations and legislatures. Combined with the large
number of academic institutions, these features offer the prospect of
testing theories of political governance that have resisted empirical
scrutiny in more conventional political and commercial settings.1
I begin the paper with an overview of the commitment, or “gains-
from-trade” (Shepsle, 1993, p. 349), theory of political governance,
followed in Section 3 by a description of the problems of academic
exchange as they relate to that theory. In Section 4, I identify a set of
factors affecting the trade-off between flexibility and commitment and
associate those factors with features of academic institutions. Section 5
describes the data, discusses specification issues, and reports results.
Among those results is the finding that—contrary to the conventional
wisdom that large numbers and heterogeneity of voters and issues
encumber democratic decision making—democratic governance in gen-
eral, and the number of “veto points” in particular, tends to be greater in
larger, “full-service” research universities than in smaller liberal arts col-
leges and special-curriculum institutions. Extensions and implications
1. Because countries vary greatly in their circumstances and conditions relative to
their number, empirical research in political science that has attempted to test theories of
political organization has had to rely principally on municipal data. Examples of research
analyzing features of municipal government in comparative contractual terms include
Frant (1993), Patashnik (1996), and Maser (1998).
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of the analysis for the broader study of political and economic organi-
zation are discussed in the final section.
2. Authority and Commitment
in Political Exchange
The modern conception of political democracy as a commitment device
is an outgrowth of research emphasizing the gains from political trade.2
In the relations between a government and its citizens, for instance, both
ruler and ruled stand to benefit from private investment stimulated by
a “bargain” limiting the wealth that the state can appropriate from its
citizens. Similarly, politicians stand to gain from striking deals with each
other, as when legislators trade votes in pursuit of the majorities nec-
essary to enact legislation benefiting their respective local constituents
(e.g., Buchanan and Tullock, 1962). The existence of mutually beneficial
bargains does not guarantee their realization, however. Differences in
the timing of actions and the accrual of benefits expose political bargains,
just like commercial deals, to the risk of reneging: Without adequate
assurances that others will, when the time comes, uphold their end of the
bargain, citizens may be reluctant to make investments and legislators to
expend the political capital necessary to achieve joint surpluses (North
and Weingast, 1989; Weingast and Marshall, 1988).
Though similar in nature to the problem of commitment in com-
mercial settings, two aspects of political exchange ostensibly complicate
the task of securing agreements among political actors. First, in contrast
to commercial transactions, no independent third party with the power
to compel performance exists to whom political transactors can appeal to
enforce their agreements. As Weingast (1993, 1995) has observed, polit-
ical transactions entail a fundamental dilemma: Any party powerful
enough to enforce promises is also powerful enough to abrogate its
own commitments and transgress the interests and well being of others.
Contracting—which exploits the coercive power of the state to enforce
agreements—is simply not available where the control or use of the
state’s coercive power is itself at issue. Political bargains must, therefore,
be self-enforcing.
Second, “self” enforcement of political bargains often requires
collective action. Because the sanctions that an individual can impose
on a defecting ruler or fellow legislator are typically small, deterrence
2. The commitment properties of democratic rule were, in fact, at the heart of demo-
cratic philosophy dating back at least to Montesquieu, James Madison, and Alexander
Hamilton. Recent research, however, has provided new theoretical insights into the
mechanisms through which democratic institutions operate. For a discussion of these
developments, see Miller and Hammond (1989).
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of political opportunism is likely to require the threat of multilateral
actions—mass revolts, protests, boycotts, and the like. Carrying out
such actions requires coordination: While the success of an insurrection
depends on attracting sufficient participation, the cost to an individual
of participating in an unsuccessful action (including the possibility of
imprisonment or execution) can be severe. To overcome the private
disincentive to participate, would-be insurgents must settle on the
definition, and find a way of communicating the occurrence, of an
infraction and the appropriate responses thereto.
Constitutions, legislative rules or other widely shared norms or
expectations about the allocation of decision authority, according to the
theory, serve this coordination function. Although a ruler with sufficient
power or support could simply ignore constitutional constraints, a
widely accepted set of public rules helps citizens (or legislators) settle
on a preferred equilibrium strategy in repeated political games by pro-
viding a common standard by which to evaluate state actions (Weingast,
1995, p. 15; see also Hardin, 1989; Kandori, 1992a,b). The fundamental
difference between autocracy and democracy, from this perspective,
lies in the nature and content of those rules and the expectations they
generate about the legitimate exercise of decision-making authority. By
leaving executive authority unconstrained, autocracy makes it difficult
for citizens to identify and verify—and thus lowers the expected punish-
ment for—governmental opportunism. Democracy, by contrast, offers a
simple, relatively verifiable criterion by which to judge the legitimacy of
governmental actions, namely, that decisions receive the explicit consent
of designated individuals or groups before being implemented.3
By defining the set of eligible voters and applicable vote thresholds,
constitutions, and bylaws also determine both whose interests are
protected and the degree of commitment to the status quo. Other things
equal, rules establishing more “veto points”—parties or groups with
the power to block a proposal—enhance commitment but, in doing
so, also make it more likely that some actions with positive expected
net benefits will be delayed or blocked. Thus, simple majority rule,
which requires acquiescence by only half of enfranchised voters, affords
protection to the majority but leaves minority interests exposed to
expropriation by a dominant coalition. A unanimity rule, by contrast,
assures that all voters’ interests are respected but would also often
make change all but impossible to accomplish. Intermediate between
unanimity and majority rule in the number of veto points established,
3. For a recent modeling effort along these lines, see Bordignon and Minelli (1998,
2000). The problem of designing constitutional rules is analogous in many ways to that
of establishing procedures for adaptation in commercial contracts. For economic analyses
viewing contracts as constitutions, see Goldberg (1976) and Crocker and Masten (1991).
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bicameral and presidential governments—which require ratification of
proposals by multiple, independently elected bodies—and superma-
jority requirements represent efforts, within this framework, to strike a
balance between the competing demands for flexibility and commitment
in political decision making.4
3. Academic Exchange and Governance
On its face, the considerations that motivate the use of democratic
governance as a commitment device in political settings seem applicable
to academic settings as well. First, education systems, like political ones,
present numerous opportunities for trade. Although typically portrayed
as a source of conflict, the broad range of interests that converge within
a university—those of faculty, students, alumni, administrators, and
private and public donors, among others—form the basis for mutually
beneficial cooperation: To the extent, for instance, that faculty and ad-
ministrators (or other patrons or “stakeholders”) place different relative
values on research and service to the institution, a bargain in which, say,
administrators compensated faculty for foregone research opportunities
with higher salaries, future appointments of desired colleagues, or any
number of other things that faculty desire, would leave both parties
better off.5
Second, the costs and benefits of academic bargains, like their
political counterparts, often accrue nonsimultaneously, making them
susceptible to reneging and appropriation. The prospect of the other
side failing to carry out its end of the bargain would tend to discourage
donors wary that their contributions will be redirected away from their
intended use, make administrators hesitant to award tenure and raises
for fear that faculty will merely reallocate their time to consulting and
leisure, and deter faculty from contributing to the teaching and service
4. The tension between commitment and flexibility is apparent in contemporary
discussions and analyses of the relative merits of unified and divided democracy, with
critics of American-style presidential democracy often complaining that the system’s
separation of powers produces governmental gridlock, whereas citizens of parliamentary
systems disparage unified control of executive and legislative functions as “elected
dictatorship.” Compare, for example, Sundquist (1986) with Reid (1998), and, for a more
general discussion, see Moe and Caldwell (1994). In this framework, oligarchy—rule by
a few—would lie between autocracy and majority rule on the commitment-flexibility
continuum.
5. A number of empirical studies have compared the goals and preferences of faculty
and administrators. See, for example, Gross and Grambsch (1974). Differences in the pref-
erences of faculty, as opposed to between faculty and administrators, are another source
of conflict in academic settings (e.g., McKenzie, 1979, 1996). Although the discussion in
the text is framed primarily in terms of the divergent preferences of administrators and
faculty, the logic applies to disagreements among faculty as well.
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objectives of the institution lest they discover their salaries and tenure
prospects lagging those of colleagues who spurned committee work in
favor of activities more likely to enhance their value in the academic
marketplace.6
To be sure, agreements between administrators and faculty (or
among faculty), unlike political and legislative bargains, are potentially
enforceable in court. In practice, however, the complexity and subtlety
of academic responsibilities and the need to accommodate changes
in demand and resources severely limit the efficacy of contracting as
a means of securing academic bargains.7 Consider, for example, the
difficulty of writing and enforcing a contract to hire a specific colleague
in the future in exchange for some current consideration. The successful
completion of such an appointment depends on the salary offered,
the other opportunities of the candidate, the research and teaching
environment of the institution, and the identity of others on the faculty,
along with numerous other intangibles. Given the range of variables
involved, an administrator’s promise to make a particular hire, or
the pledge of one faculty faction to support a future appointment or
promotion of a scholar in another faction’s specialty, is likely to be
easily evaded (or subtly sabotaged) once the first parties’ objectives
have been achieved. Thus, although contracting is possible in principle,
as a practical matter, academic bargains, like political ones, must largely
be self-enforcing.
Finally, and most important, deterrence of cheating on academic
bargains is likely to require multilateral action. While the sanctions
6. A good illustration of the tension between donor and academic objectives can be
found in the controversy surrounding Yale University’s return of a $20 million gift from
Lee M. Bass (see, e.g., Mercer, 1995).
7. McKenzie (1996) and Besse (1973, pp. 110–111) provide good descriptions of some
of the difficulties of quantifying professorial responsibilities. Milgrom and Roberts (1992,
pp. 127–129) use education to illustrate the difficulties of complete contracting. Even if
some dimensions of academic transactions (such as salary or course load) are contractible,
incentive distortions resulting from the inability to contract over other aspects of perfor-
mance are likely to make explicit contracting unattractive (see, generally, Holmstrom and
Milgrom, 1991, 1994). Finally, Bernheim and Whinston (1998, pp. 902–904) also use faculty
employment contracts to motivate their theory of incomplete contracting.
Academic and political transactions are also similar in their general proscription of
cash side payments as a means of “settling up.” Thus, the exchange of cash for political
favors, whether between citizens and politicians or among legislators, is illegal in most
societies, whereas trading of votes (logrolling) generally is not. In academic institutions,
the tenure system and restrictions on the distribution of surpluses by educational
nonprofits—themselves endogenous institutional responses to problems of contracting
for education services—place limits on the use of cash to bring about bargains: Allowing
administrators to make side payments in exchange for faculty investments—in a “pay-as-
you-go” fashion—would counteract the safeguards against arbitrary or vindictive actions
afforded by the tenure system and substantially weaken the nondistribution constraint
that characterizes not-for-profit organization. See generally, Hansmann (1980), Masten
(1995), Carmichael (1988), and McKenzie (1996).
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that a particular faculty member can unilaterally inflict on a defecting
administrator or colleagues tend to be few and small, the private costs
of participating in a faculty revolt—which might prove an effective de-
terrent if carried out—are potentially large, in terms of forgone research
but also, and perhaps especially, as a result of an administrator’s (or
majority faction’s) ability to target rewards and retaliation selectively.8
To make the threat of multilateral action credible and thereby secure the
benefits of academic bargains, a means of identifying and coordinating
responses to cheating on academic bargains may thus be needed.9
As in political contexts, widely shared norms or expectations
about the allocation of authority for academic decisions may serve this
coordinating function.10 First, compared to the deep knowledge needed
to determine whether the substance of a bargain has been honored,
conformance with rules defining decision rights and requirements is
relatively easy to verify. Second, expanding the set of parties with
veto authority increases the stability of bargains. In institutions that
vest authority exclusively in administrators, a discrete change in policy
or practice (such as a change in program emphasis or in the relative
weights assigned teaching and research in tenure decisions) requires a
change in the priorities or identity of only a single individual; effecting
the same policy change under rules requiring the concurrence of a
specified majority of enfranchised faculty, by contrast, would necessitate
a shift in the overall distribution of faculty preferences or identities
sufficient to make the new policy the preferred course of the decisive
voter (or voters). By giving those who would be adversely affected
by a proposal the potential to block its passage, faculty governance
8. Media accounts, lawsuits, and other sources report allegations of retaliation by
administrators using salary, course load and teaching assignments, office space and
termination, among other things. In a recent and particularly egregious illustration,
a professor was reportedly put under effective “house arrest,” required by university
administrators to remain in his office and forbidden to leave campus without permission
and an escort during regular working hours (Walsh, 2002). More often, retaliation is likely
to take more subtle forms such as being passed over for promotions and loss of raises and
influence.
9. A famous example of the failure to sustain a collective response to administrator
opportunism in American higher education was the turn-of-the-century case of Edward A.
Ross at Stanford. At the behest of founder Leland Stanford’s widow, Stanford University
president David Starr Jordan forced Ross, an economist and secretary of the American
Economic Association, to resign for having publicly voiced unpopular positions (on Asian
immigration and municipal ownership of public utilities). Although seven prominent
Stanford professors quit in protest, and despite widespread condemnation of Stanford’s
action, plans for a nationwide boycott of Stanford “quickly lost its thrust” as even staunch
defenders of academic freedom began accepting appointments to fill the positions opened
by the resignations (Veysey, 1965, p. 415).
10. For an interesting account of the effect of norms on academic governance in
practice, comparing the universities of Michigan and California-Berkeley, see Hollinger
(2001).
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increases confidence in the continuity of existing policies and, thereby,
the willingness of faculty to conform their behavior to standards and
policies peculiar to a particular institution. By the same token, requiring
the assent of faculty and administrators affords administrators (and
the interests they represent) protection against faculty overreaching
and, to the extent it further contributes to the stability of academic
policies, stands to help preserve minority interests among faculty as
well. The trade-off—bemoaned by administrators, trustees, and even
some faculty—is that, in making it harder to effect adaptations, joint
administrator-faculty authority (divided democracy) increases the risk
that efficient adjustments will be forestalled. As one critic put it, shared
governance “becomes, in effect, governance by multiple veto by campus
groups with vested interests [that] can stymie necessary reforms” (de
Russy, 1996).11
4. Comparative Analysis
The theory of political organization outlined above offers a plausible
rationale for the existence of democracy in political and academic
settings but does not, by itself, account for variations in the incidence and
form of democratic governance among either states or schools. Perhaps
as important, it also leaves unexplained why democratic governance is
not more widely used to address commitment problems in other settings
where third-party enforcement is also infeasible or impractical. Agency
theorists, for instance, have long noted that an employer’s inability to
commit not to revise compensation schemes limits its ability to elicit ef-
fort and firm-specific investments from employees (e.g., Gibbons, 1987,
1998). In fact, the conditions alleged to motivate democratic governance
in political and academic settings could be argued to characterize most
traditional employment relations: In the typical firm, (i) the effort and
investments employees are willing to make depend on the credibility of
promised rewards; (ii) contingent contracting is impractical (and seldom
observed); (iii) multiple employees interact with a single employer; and
(iv) the sanctions that an individual employee can exact on a reneging
employer (other than quitting) are generally few and relatively minor.12
Yet the archetypal firm is governed autocratically, with formal authority
11. Although the existence of positive net benefits implies that a set of transfers could,
in principle, leave even those directly hurt by a proposal better off, the practical problems
of agreeing on and effecting those transfers (think about the difficulty of satisfying a
unanimity requirement for hiring in even a moderately sized academic department) will
often prevent, or at a minimum substantially delay, their realization.
12. Even the ability to use cash to effect bargains within traditional firms is, as in
political and academic situations, circumscribed: “the restriction on the use of money as a
means to curry favors and compete for services within the firm” represents a constraint on
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over the organization’s operations consolidated in the owner or owners’
agent.13
There are, of course, good reasons for preferring centralized
authority in organizations. Autocrats, unlike executives in pluralist
systems who are obliged to obtain the consent of others before taking
action, can act unilaterally and decisively in times of crisis or opportu-
nity. In the language of the theory of the firm, hierarchical governance
affords executives the authority to respond to changing circumstances in
“an adaptive, sequential fashion” (Williamson, 1975, p. 25). Democratic
decision making, by contrast, is widely disparaged as slow, cumber-
some, and inefficient. Frequent criticisms include policy incoherence;
lack of accountability; capture by special, entrenched, or ideological
interests; and an inherent propensity to preserve the status quo to the
extent of fostering “gridlock.”14 Ideally, a positive theory of political
and academic organization would yield insights into why democratic
governance is not used as a commitment device in traditional business
firms as well as explain variations in governance form among states
and schools. Toward that end, I first draw on the literatures on political
and economic organization to identify a set of factors expected to affect
the demand for democracy as a commitment device generally, and then
relate those factors to the characteristics of academic institutions.15
4.1 The Demand for Democracy
As set out in the theory, the commitment value of democracy derives
ultimately from a combination of (i) the vulnerability of transactions
to reneging (and inadequacy of unilateral reputational and legal sanc-
tions as deterrents thereto), and (ii) difficulty in the evaluation and
communication of violations of substantive agreements as a trigger for
collective “self-enforcement.” Where individuals are protected either
by their mobility or, absent that, by consensus on the limits of executive
discretion, the flexibility advantages of autocracy are likely to dominate.
the activities of employees that is “so obvious as to elude our recognition” (Holmstrom,
1999, p. 94).
13. The peremptory authority of executives is the property most often associated with
internal organization in the theory of the firm. In the words of Milgrom and Roberts,
“what most distinguishes any centralized organization is the authority and autonomy of
its top decisionmakers or management—that is, their broad rights to intervene in lower-
level decisions and the relative immunity of their decisions from intervention by others”
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1990, p. 79). See, also, Coase (1937), Simon (1951), Grossman and
Hart (1986), and Williamson (1975).
14. Compare Schuster et al. (1994, p. 9) and de Russy (1996) (criticizing university
governance) with Fiorina (1996, pp. 85–87), Krehbiel (1996, p. 9), and Pfiffner (1991, pp. 44–
46) (describing the problems of political democracy).
15. I discuss the implications of the analysis for understanding the relative rarity of
democratic governance in traditional firms in the conclusion.
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On the one hand, transactors whose investments are not location- (or
institution-) specific and who can therefore relocate to a new community
(or employer) at low cost have little need for commitment mechanisms
(of any type). On the other, communities whose members find it easy
to agree on, communicate and verify the occurrence of a substantive
transgression will have less need to resort to procedural rules and
norms to coordinate collective sanctions. Only where individual mo-
bility is sufficiently limited and collective enforcement ineffective is
the commitment value of democratic rules likely to exceed autocracy’s
administrative economies.
Outside the political and academic spheres, substantial evidence
exists that immobility, or “nonredeployability,” increases the demand
for protective governance structures: Both long-term contracts and ver-
tical integration, for example, are more likely for transactions involving
relationship-specific investments.16 By extension, differences in “migra-
tion” possibilities among communities should lead to a higher value for
democratic processes (or other efforts to protect political interests) at the
national than municipal level, and in cities than in smaller, more compact
“communities” such as, say, apartment complexes. Applied to academic
institutions, the logic implies a greater tendency toward democratic
governance, and toward forms of democracy more protective of the
status quo, in institutions with less mobile faculty, ceteris paribus.
Because the credibility of collective sanctions depends on the
ability of individuals to recognize, communicate, and coordinate re-
sponses, the prospect of successful collective enforcement of substantive
agreements is commonly linked to the homogeneity of community
members’ perceptions and interests. Discussing the collective enforce-
ment of transactions between medieval traders and their agents, for
example, Grief (1993) notes that “[i]f some merchants consider specific
actions to constitute ‘cheating’ while others hold a different opinion, the
effectiveness of the collective threat is undermined” (p. 542), and goes on
to discuss the role of ethnic and cultural homogeneity in promoting the
consensus needed to sustain cooperation. Similarly, Weingast identifies
diversity of citizen beliefs and preferences as crucial impediments to
effective limits on sovereign power, observing that, where “there is a
diversity of preferences over outcomes, . . . the nature of citizen views
about the appropriate role of the state and what actions constitute a
16. The theoretical argument regarding relationship-specific investments in economic
transactions has been most fully laid out in the transaction cost literature, beginning with
Williamson (1975, 1985) and Klein et al. (1978). The empirical evidence has been reviewed
in a number of surveys, including Shelanski and Klein (1995). In political science, mobility
has played its most conspicuous role as a prerequisite to Tiebout-style competition among
governments (Tiebout, 1956).
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transgression are likely to differ widely, . . . making it more likely that
the game will result in asymmetric equilibria in which the sovereign
transgresses the rights of some and retains the support of others”
(1995, p. 14). By contrast, “When the state of agreement in society is
large, producing something approaching a consensus, a sovereign who
attempts to transgress against citizens cannot survive” (id.). Conformity
of interests and beliefs can be expected to play a similar role in academic
institutions, making the threat of collective retaliation for substantive
transgressions more credible among faculty with more similar experi-
ences, interests and perceptions. As heterogeneity of faculty beliefs and
preferences increase, so should the demand for voting rules that raise
the threshold for altering the status quo.17
Finally, firms, colleges, and nations also transact with external par-
ties whose participation and cooperation may depend on the credibility
of bargains. Aware that democratic bodies can vote to redirect expen-
ditures, potential investors or donors, for example, may be reluctant
to contribute resources to democratically controlled entities. To secure
funding from such patrons, members may find it necessary to cede some
control over the use of contributions by giving patrons (or their agent) a
veto or, as in the case of for-profit corporations and their shareholders,
full authority over expenditures and operations. Even in political re-
lations, governments—including nations philosophically predisposed
toward democracy such as colonial Britain or the US during the Cold
War—have frequently exhibited a preference for dealing with client
states ruled by an autocrat-agent that could be more easily controlled
or replaced than a democratic government. Presumably, the insecurity
of, and hence the value of ceding authority to, external investor-patrons
will be larger the greater the disparity between their interests and those
of the recipient community’s members.
Table I summarizes the pair-wise predictions of the relative effi-
ciency of autocracy and unified and divided democracy based on the
preceding discussion, where β ij = β i − β j represents the predicted
effect of the corresponding explanatory variable on the differential
efficiency of governance forms i and j, and subscripts a, u, and d represent
autocracy, unified democracy, and divided democracy, respectively.
17. Although simple majority rule protects the interests of enfranchised majorities,
it leaves minority interests subject to majority appropriation. Forms of democracy that
increase the number of parties with veto authority both expand the range of interests
protected and increase the stability of the status quo.
In addition to its direct effect on collective enforcement, heterogeneity also stands to
increase the demand for democracy indirectly through its effect on mobility: Given non-
convexities in production (or nonrivalrous consumption), heterogeneity of preferences,
abilities and locations implies fewer and less compatible trading partners and, hence, less
mobility.
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Table I.
Summary of Pairwise Governance Cost
Comparisons
Unified Democracy Divided Democracy Divided Democracy
Relative to Relative to Relative to
Autocracy Autocracy Unified Democracy
βua βda βdu
Immobility; >0 >0 >0
heterogeneity
Disparity of <0 <0 >0
external interests
Greater immobility and heterogeneity of community members is pre-
dicted to increase the value of both unified and divided democracy
relative to autocracy (βua, βda > 0) and of divided democracy relative
to unified democracy (βdu > 0), whereas greater disparity between the
interests of community members and outside patrons is predicted to
favor the allocation of greater authority to an executive serving as agent
for those patrons, with βa > βd > βu.
4.2 Characterizing Educational Institutions
Faculty mobility and the interests and perceptions of faculty and patrons
are difficult to measure directly, and what proxies are available tend to be
endogenous: Attributes of faculty at a particular institution, for instance,
are likely to vary more frequently than—and arguably as a function
of—the institution’s governance.18 Two aspects of academic institutions
that tend to be both relatively stable and antecedent to an institution’s
governance, however, are its function (or “mission”) and affiliation. The
differences in function that form the basis for classifying institutions
as doctorate-granting research universities, liberal arts colleges and
specialized institutions such as technological institutes, music schools,
and theological seminaries, for example, are largely foundational, as is
an institution’s status as public, private or religiously affiliated.19 To the
extent that categories of institutions differ systematically in the relevant
18. McCormick and Meiners (1988), for example, use faculty governance as an ex-
planatory variable in the determination of research productivity.
19. The Carnegie Classification of Institutions of Higher Education, one of the earliest
and most widely used classifications schemes, described its purpose as “to identify
categories of colleges and universities that would be relatively homogeneous with respect
to the functions of the institutions as well as with respect to characteristics of students and
faculty members” (Carnegie Commission, 1973, p. v).
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characteristics, corresponding variations in governance form would
provide provisional support for the theory. The remainder of this section
draws on the existing literature to rank institutions conceptually in terms
of the heterogeneity and mobility of faculty and the disparity of patron
interests; Section 5.2.1 presents statistical evidence that institutional
categories vary significantly in their observable characteristics.
Heterogeneity. Two ways in which institutions differ across cate-
gories are (i) the number and breadth of their activities and programs
and (ii) the degree of faculty specialization within those programs.
Compared to liberal arts colleges devoted principally to undergraduate
education or to specialized institutions with a limited subject range,
large, “full service” research institutions present more issues and activ-
ities over which faculty preferences and attitudes may differ: Research
versus teaching; undergraduate versus graduate instruction; liberal arts
versus professional or “vocational” training; allocations of institutional
resources among disciplines or between theoretical and practical or
applied scholarship, and so on. Large, research universities are also
able to accommodate greater faculty specialization within programs and
departments, creating greater diversity in interests, methods and per-
spectives and greater difficulty in understanding and evaluating others’
contributions.20 The effect of these differences suggests the alignment of
categories of institutions along a continuum of heterogeneity roughly
as depicted in Figure 1.21
Mobility. Though less definitive, faculty mobility seems likely to
yield a similar ranking of institutions. In theory, the greater special-
ization of faculty at research institutions and the relatively small num-
ber and steeper quality gradient of schools at the upper end of the
quality distribution (see, e.g., Masten, 1995) would tend to exacerbate
the “matching” problem faced by such faculty: Compared to, say, an
instructor at a lower-tier liberal arts college whose teaching skills,
though not as highly remunerative, may be equally valued by the
relatively large number of similar institutions, faculty at top-tier research
institutions (at least below the superstar level) are likely to have a
harder time finding equivalent positions at institutions of comparable
status and resources. Empirical research provides some support for this
conjecture. Ehrenberg et al.’s (1991) summary of research on faculty
mobility concludes that “[faculty] mobility tends to be higher at lesser
20. Historically, many of the governance arrangements associated with modern Amer-
ican universities can be traced directly to the rise of research as a function of universities
in the late 1800s and early 1900s, and the specialization, heterogeneity and disputes it
engendered. See Masten (2006).
21. To the extent that faculty at specialized institutions engage in research as well as
instruction, such faculty would tend to exhibit more heterogeneity along this dimension
than would faculty at a small liberal arts college oriented exclusively toward teaching.













FIGURE 1. ORDERING OF INSTITUTIONS IN RELATION TO HET-
EROGENEITY
quality institutions” (although their own results appear to contradict
some of the earlier studies they cite). Ransom’s (1993) finding that,
controlling for quality, faculty salaries decline with seniority at a higher
rate at “high-quality universities” can also be interpreted as consistent
with the existence of lower mobility at higher-tier research institutions,
allowing these institutions to appropriate more of the rents accruing to
academic transactions.
Patron Interests. In addition to tuition revenue, academic institutions
often depend for financial resources on contributions from donors,
governments, and religious organizations. Where the interests of the
donor and recipient broadly coincide, contributions can be made with
relative confidence that they will go to support their intended purpose.
Where, in contrast, the interests of those who supply financial resources
and those who control their disbursement differ significantly, potential
contributors may be deterred by the prospect that their support will be
redirected away from its intended use. Although this problem exists for
all institutions, its severity will be greater where the objectives of patrons
extend beyond the mere production and dissemination of knowledge.
Thus, inasmuch as organized religions establish and support colleges
and universities to advance nonsecular objectives, those organizations
are likely to desire greater control over the administration of the enter-
prise. By the same token, state-sponsored institutions should be more
likely to be run autocratically: The establishment of public universities
and colleges in the US originally arose specifically in response to the
desire on the part of state legislatures to assure that financial support
for higher education served state objectives following the Supreme
Court’s 1819 decision in the Dartmouth College case that extended
constitutional protection to the independence of private universities
from state authority (Duryea, 1973, p. 20; see also Goldin and Katz,
1999, pp. 50–52).
5. Empirical Analysis
5.1 Data and Methods
The remainder of the paper analyzes patterns in the allocation of
decision-making authority using data from a 1970 survey of faculty
participation in governance in American colleges and universities
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conducted under the auspices of the American Association of Univer-
sity Professors (Report of the Survey Subcommittee of Committee T,
1971). The sample contains responses from 826 four-year institutions,
or roughly half of the 1,665 such institutions in the United States at
the time.22 Table II shows the distribution of institutions in the sample
by category and affiliation. As can be seen from the table, the sample
contains a fairly broad mix of institution types.
The survey asked representatives of each institution to identify the
locus of decision authority in each of 31 areas of decision making.23 Five
categories of decision authority were defined as follows:24 Decisions
or actions over which administrators had unilateral authority were
categorized as either Consultation, Discussion, or None, depending on
the nature and form of communication between faculty and admin-
istrators required to occur before a decision is made. Because faculty
lack veto power over decisions in all three of these categories, I have
combined these three into a single category, Administrator Determination,
for purposes of this study. The label Faculty Determination was given to
decisions for which “the faculty of an academic unit or its duly au-
thorized representatives have final legislative or operational authority
with respect to policy or action.” Finally, Joint Action refers to cases
in which actions or policy determinations require “formal agreement
by both the faculty and other components of the institution” and are
subject to “veto by any component.”25 In the terminology of political
systems, administrator determination corresponds to autocracy, faculty
determination to unified or parliamentary democracy, and joint action
to divided or presidential democracy.
Table III summarizes the distribution of decision authority among
the five categories of decision-making practices for each of the
22. US Office of Education, National Center for Educational Statistics (1971). Also in
the data, but not analyzed here, is information on 141 junior and community colleges
offering two-year degrees.
23. For two-thirds of the institutions (542), answers to the survey were supplied jointly
by faculty representatives and administrators. Administrators alone supplied responses
at 169 institutions and faculty representatives at 45 institutions. Finally, at 70 institutions,
separate responses from faculty and administrators were submitted, bringing the total
number of “observations” to 896. Unless otherwise noted, observations for institutions
that supplied separate faculty and administrator responses are given weights of one half
in the estimations. Not surprisingly, given the relatively small number of institutions with
dual responses, such weighting has little effect on the results.
24. See the Appendix for more detailed definitions.
25. In some cases, authority over a decision area varies among units or faculty within
a given institution. In such cases, the survey asked respondents to report the percent of
faculty in their institution governed by each governance form. For example, an institution
in which 90% of the faculty are in departments where appointments require joint action
and 10% belong to departments where faculty are appointed unilaterally by administrators
would report Faculty Determination: 0; Joint Action: 0.9; and Administrator Determina-
tion: 0.1.
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Table II.
Numbers of Institutions by Category
and Affiliation
Public Private Catholic Other Religious Total
University 80 30 14 6 130
LA plus 189 66 43 53 351
College 52 45 58 153 308
Specialized 13 21 – 3 37
Total 334 162 115 215 826
thirty-one decision types covered by the survey. As seen in the table,
governance varies considerably across decision types. Faculties are, for
example, much more likely on average to have formal decision-making
authority (faculty determination or joint action) on issues pertaining to
academic operation and policy (decisions 6–8) than on financial issues
and administrative appointments (decisions 14–20). In addition, the
table shows considerable variation in authority within decision types,
suggesting that decision-making authority varies across institutions as
well as among decision areas. It is this cross-institutional variation that
is the focus of this paper.26
For estimation purposes, I treat governance structure as the out-
come of a discrete choice problem in which governance form is selected
as a function of institutional attributes and decision type. Because the
allocation of decision authority is not uniform across decision areas
within a given institution—faculty at a single institution may have
exclusive authority over some decisions, joint authority over others,
and no authority over the rest—institutions do not fall neatly into a
single governance category but rather differ in the degree to which
decisions are made autocratically versus democratically. I deal with this
by treating the sample as panel data and correcting for institution- and
decision-specific effects.27
26. The analysis of variations in the allocation of decision authority across decisions
within institutions is the subject of work in progress.
27. More specifically, I treat the governance form for each decision type, t, in each
institution, i, as the unit of observation and divide the explanatory variables into four
components as follows:
Zit = a vector of observable institutional attributes;
ϕi = unmeasured characteristics of institutions that have common effects across deci-
sion types;
μt = unmeasured aspects of decision types that have common effects across institu-
tions; and
εit, = an error specific to each observation.
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Because the focus of this study is on variations in governance
form across institutions rather than across decision types, unobserved
decision attributes are treated as fixed effects. An advantage of this
specification (over, say, measuring governance as an average across all
decision types) is that treating each decision separately and including
decision-type fixed effects allows for differences in the variance of the
dependent variable among decision areas and permits the estimated
marginal effects of institutional attributes on governance form to vary
across decisions.
5.2 Estimations and Results
The empirical analysis is conducted in three stages. In Section 5.2.1, I pro-
vide some background evidence supporting the existence of systematic
differences among institutional categories. Section 5.2.2 reports results
on the binomial choice between autocratic and democratic governance
treating unified (faculty determination) and divided democracy (joint
action) as a single category. Multinomial estimates of the choice among
all three governance categories are the subject of Section 5.2.3.
5.2.1 Institutional Characteristics
For evidence on whether institutions in the sample differ significantly in
their characteristics, I examine whether various measurable attributes
of the institutions vary systematically across institutional categories.
Definitions and descriptive statistics for the variables used in the
estimations are contained in Table IV. Panel A of the table provides
definitions for the basic category and affiliation indicators and their
sample means; panel B contains definitions and descriptive statistics for
four institutional attributes: student selectivity, research prominence,
institution size, and faculty salaries.28
Table V reports the results of regressions relating each of the
institutional attributes in panel B to the institutional categories and
affiliation variables. (Columns (1)–(3) are estimated using OLS and
column (4) as ordered probit.) The results show significant differences
in the characteristics of institutions between most categories. Not
28. Data sources are listed in footnotes to the table. Wherever possible, information
from multiple sources was used to check the reliability and accuracy of the AAUP
survey data. This and various other diagnostics identified several incorrectly coded data
points in the data. In all cases, the most reliable data source was used. In cases where
major discrepancies could not be resolved, the observation was eliminated from the
sample. The most significant and problematic cases were three instances in which the
identity of the institution systematically diverged from information provided. In two
cases the observations were omitted (University of Illinois Medical Complex and Rutgers
University Camden Campus). The third case involved the institution labeled as University
of California Entire Campus, which was determined to be the University of California at
Berkeley. This observation was retained in the data.
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Table IV.




UNIV Research university offering a
range of graduate degrees
0.16
LAPLUS Liberal arts college offering
bachelor degrees plus some
graduate degrees
0.42
College Liberal arts college (omitted
category)
0.37









CATHOLIC Institution affiliated with Catholic
Church
0.14
OTHER RELIG Protestant or Jewish institution 0.26
Panel B
SELECTIVITY:1 = 0, Not selective (median SAT
< 450)
0.30
= 1, Competitive (med. SAT
between 450 and 550)
0.54
= 2, Very selective (med. SAT
between 550 and 600)
0.08
= 3, Most selective (median SAT
>600)
0.08
Continuous variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
RESEARCH Number of “leading” academic
departments based on rated
quality of graduate faculty2
0.60 3.46 0 35
FACSIZE Number of faculty 245 312 7 2200
AVGSAL Average salary of associate
professors (in thousands)3
13.7 2.1 9.6 23.3
1Source: Barron’s Profiles of American Colleges, 1970, pp. xix–xxvi.
2Source: K.D. Roose and C.J. Anderson, A Rating of Graduate Programs. Washington, DC: American Council on
Education. 1970.
3Source: AAUP Bulletin, Summer 1971, pp. 247–285. To abstract from the effects of the composition of faculty rank on
average salary, average salary figures for association professors are used. The use of associate professor salaries also
permits a larger sample size in that the number of associate professors is more likely to exceed the reporting threshold
of five individuals. Results using average salary of all faculty are comparable.
670 Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
Table V.
Institutional Attributes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RESEARCH FACSIZE/100 AVGSAL SELECTIVITY
UNIV 3.468 5.446 3.188 1.051
(9.44) (22.54) (13.43) (7.85)
LAPLUS −0.080 0.737 1.195 0.593
(−0.29) (4.05) (6.20) (5.89)
SPECIAL 0.006 0.319 2.492 0.261
(0.01) (0.82) (5.77) (1.26)
PUBLIC −0.499 1.724 −1.002 −1.353
(−1.59) (8.33) (−5.00) (−11.58)
CATHOLIC −0.975 −0.438 −1.491 −0.437
(−2.42) (−1.65) (−5.41) (−3.08)
OTHER RELIG −0.683 −0.027 −0.545 −0.395
(−1.91) (−0.12) (−2.24) (−3.15)
Constant 0.606 0.614 13.107 –
(1.90) (2.92) (60.51)
N 823 823 592 823
Test statistica 24.0 158.6 43.4 184.2
Goodness of fitb 0.15 0.54 0.30 0.10
t-statistics in parentheses.
aF reported in columns (1)–(3), χ2 in column (4).
bR2 reported in columns (1)–(3); Pseudo R2 in column (4).
surprisingly, universities are significantly more likely than other in-
stitutions to have top-ranked research programs. Also as expected,
research universities tend to be larger, have the highest paid faculty,
and attract the best students; while “liberal-arts-plus” institutions are
intermediate between universities and liberal arts colleges (the omitted
category) in each of these dimensions. Finally, specialized institutions
do not differ significantly from liberal arts colleges in size, research
prominence, or selectivity. In terms of faculty compensation, however,
specialized institutions appear, on average, to be more like universities
than liberal arts colleges; even though specialized institutions may
have a narrower disciplinary breadth than liberal arts colleges, faculty
at specialized institutions may resemble more their counterparts in
departments of research universities than liberal arts professors in terms
of research orientation and faculty specialization within the institution’s
disciplinary focus. Although the available variables do not measure
heterogeneity and mobility directly, the results do provide evidence that
institutions in different categories do, on average, differ significantly in
their observable attributes and that those differences generally “order”
as hypothesized.
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Table VI.
Binomial Probit Estimation of Faculty Governance
Uncorrected Estimates
Random Effects Robust
Proportions Binary Standard Errors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
UNIV 0.279 0.291 0.445 0.291
(9.79) (9.93) (7.00) (3.80)
LAPLUS 0.092 0.099 0.185 0.099
(4.27) (4.50) (3.76) (1.78)
SPECIAL −0.322 −0.350 −0.233 −0.350
(−6.78) (−7.19) (−2.38) (−2.82)
PUBLIC −0.350 −0.380 −0.345 −0.380
(−14.19) (−15.07) (−6.25) (−5.94)
CATHOLIC −0.262 −0.285 −0.228 −0.285
(−8.40) (−8.93) (−3.36) (−3.30)
OTHER RELIG −0.012 −0.019 0.164 −0.019
(−0.44) (−0.67) (2.72) (−0.27)
Rho 0.380
(27.79)
N 27,159 26,570 26,570 26,570
L −13,651.44 −13,022.17 −11,008.55 −13,022.17
LR −13,854.06 −13,244.07 −11,047.70 −13,244.07
χ2 405.24 443.8 78.3 443.80
t-statistics in parentheses.
N is number of observations.
L is the log likelihood value.
LR is the restricted log likelihood value (coefficients restricted to one).
Decision-specific fixed effects included but not reported.
5.2.2 Binomial Analysis
In this section, I report results on the incidence of faculty veto (whether
through faculty determination or joint action) as a function of institu-
tional category and affiliation. Table VI contains estimated coefficients
and t-statistics for four specifications of the binary choice model.
(Decision-specific fixed effects are included but not reported in all
models in the paper.) Columns (1) and (2) report probit results in which
the observations in the sample are treated as statistically independent
(i.e., institution-specific errors, ϕi, are assumed to be uncorrelated).
Because governance arrangements can differ among faculty for a given
issue within a given institution, the survey data report the proportion
of faculty within an institution covered by each governance alternative.
For the results in column (1), this proportion was treated as a “grouped”
response (see, e.g., Greene, 1995, p. 413). The estimation yielding the
results in column (2) differed from that in column (1) only in that
the dependent variable was converted to binary form by setting the
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dependent variable to equal one if the reported proportion of decisions
governed democratically is greater than 0.5 and zero otherwise.29
Because unobserved attributes of institutions may have common
effects on the choice of governance form for different decisions, the
assumption of independent institution-specific errors is likely to be
invalid. To allow for this possibility, columns (3) and (4) report results
from estimations using two different methods to correct for the non-
independence of the error terms: For the results in (3), institution-specific
errors, φi are treated as random effects, whereas in column (4), reported
t-statistics are calculated using robust (Huber/White/sandwich) stan-
dard errors clustered on the identify of the institution.30
The results are fairly robust across specifications. Faculties are
more likely to participate in (have veto authority over) decisions in uni-
versities and, to a lesser extent, in liberal arts institutions offering some
graduate degrees (LAPLUS) than in liberal arts colleges (the omitted
category), whereas decisions at specialized institutions are significantly
more likely to be made autocratically. Hence, the ordering of the main
institutional categories—universities, liberal arts plus, colleges, and
specialized institutions—is consistent with the main prediction of the
commitment theory. The results also show that democratic governance
is less prevalent at public and Catholic institutions than at private ones,
consistent with these institutions’ association with a distinct external
patron. The same does not appear to be true, however, for other
religious (Protestant and two Jewish) institutions, which either dif-
fer insignificantly or are somewhat less likely (in the random effects
specification) than private institutions to use administrator determi-
nation.31 Finally, although the significance of the coefficients generally
falls, as expected, following correction of the standard errors for non-
independence, in all but one case (the coefficient on LAPLUS in column
(4) is significant only at the 0.10 level), the significance of the coefficients
remains well above conventional levels.
5.2.3 Multinomial Analysis
The binomial estimates above reveal variation in the incidence of
democratic governance across institution types consistent with its
29. The dependent variable takes a value of zero or one in approximately 85% (22,979)
of the observations. In the remaining 15% (4,180 observations), the dependent variable is
a proper fraction. Estimating the model defining the dependent variable as one for values
greater than 0.9 or by dropping observations for which the reported proportion is strictly
between zero and one does not affect the qualitative results.
30. This method assumes independence between clusters but allows, and corrects for,
non-independence of errors within clusters. For a discussion and references, see Stata
Corp., User’s Guide (1999, pp. 231–252).
31. The greater reliance on administrator determination in Catholic than other reli-
gious institutions is consistent with the more centralized and hierarchical structure of
Catholicism relative to most Protestant denominations. See, for example, Allen (1995).
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hypothesized commitment function. The theory also, however, predicts
a preference for joint action over faculty determination as faculty hetero-
geneity and immobility increase (βdu > 0). Table VII reports the results
of the multinomial logit analysis of the choice among administrator
determination (autocracy), faculty determination (unified democracy),
and joint action (divided democracy). (Again, decision-specific fixed
effects are included but not reported.) For the results in columns (1)–(5),
the dependent variable is the proportion of faculty at each institution
covered by each governance mode (i.e., the responses are treated as
“grouped”). The figures in columns (1) and (2) are the estimated co-
efficients (and associated t-statistics), whereas the figures in columns
(3)–(5) are the marginal probabilities corresponding to those estimates.
As was the case with the grouped binomial estimates in the preceding
section, the standard errors used to compute the t-statistics in columns
(1)–(5) have not been corrected for institution-specific error correlations.
To facilitate correction for within-institution correlation in errors, I again
transformed the proportions to discrete values. As in column (4) of Table
VI, t-statistics in columns (6) and (7) are calculated using robust standard
errors clustered on institutions.
The coefficients in columns (1) and (6) show the estimated effects
of institution type and affiliation on the propensity to use joint action
relative to administrator determination. The estimated coefficients are
again similar in the two specifications despite the transformation of the
dependent variable and resulting change in sample size. Relaxation of
the independence assumption also reduces the absolute value of the
t-statistics but, as before, the coefficients generally remain significant
at conventional levels. Consistent with the commitment theory, hetero-
geneity increases the attractiveness of divided democracy (joint action)
relative to autocracy (administrator determination): Compared to liberal
arts colleges (the omitted category), universities and, to a smaller extent,
liberal arts colleges offering some graduate degrees (LAPLUS) are more
likely, and specialized institutions less likely, to adopt joint action over
administrator determination. The results also indicate, as predicted,
that public and Catholic institutions are significantly more likely than
private institutions to use administrator determination relative to joint
action. As before, other religious-affiliated institutions do not signif-
icantly differ from their private counterparts in their preference for
democratic versus autocratic governance. The marginal probabilities
(see columns (3) and (5)) reveal the same patterns; the probability of
administrator determination is lower, and that of joint action higher,
at more heterogeneous institutions and at private than at public or
Catholic-affiliated institutions.
Columns (2) and (7) report the analogous coefficients for faculty
determination relative to joint action. As expected, public and Catholic
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Table VIII.
Estimated Probabilities of Authority for Tenure
Decisions (Based on Estimates in Table VI,
Columns (1) and (2))
Public Catholic Other Religious Private
Specialized 0.81 0.78 0.76 0.71
0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03
0.18 0.20 0.21 0.26
College 0.74 0.70 0.62 0.61
0.04 0.04 0.08 0.08
0.23 0.25 0.30 0.30
LA plus 0.70 0.67 0.58 0.57
0.04 0.04 0.08 0.08
0.26 0.29 0.34 0.35
University 0.62 0.59 0.50 0.49
0.05 0.05 0.09 0.09
0.33 0.37 0.41 0.42
Notes: Bold: Administrator Determination; Plain: Faculty Determination; Italics: Joint Action.
(albeit not other religious) institutions are less likely than private ones
to give faculty exclusive authority over decisions. Faculties also are less
likely to have exclusive authority, as opposed to just veto authority, at
universities and, somewhat less so, at colleges with partial graduate
programs than at strictly liberal arts colleges, as predicted by the theory.
The exception is the positive coefficient for specialized institutions,
which does not align with the commitment hypothesis; to the extent that
faculty at specialized institutions are more homogeneous (and mobile)
than their counterparts at liberal arts colleges, the commitment theory
predicts less need at specialized institutions for the added security of-
fered by divided democracy relative to unified democracy. Nevertheless,
the marginal probability that joint action will be adopted (see column
(3)) is significantly lower at specialized than liberal arts institutions,
implying that, overall, specialized institutions remain less likely than
other institutions to use either form of democratic governance.
Finally, to explore these relationships further, I reestimated the
model including variables representing size and research prominence,
the results of which are reported in columns (8) and (9). The main
difference in the results is that the coefficient on UNIV in the joint
action relative to administrator determination equation (column (8))
becomes insignificant. The coefficients on RESEARCH and FACSIZE,
however, are significantly positive (at the 0.10 and 0.05% levels, re-
spectively) in that column, again supporting the prediction that large,
research-oriented institutions (i.e., universities) tend to prefer joint
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action over administrator determination. Other results are qualitatively
unaffected.
To provide a sense of the magnitude of the predicted differences in
governance arrangements, I report in Table VIII estimated probabilities
using the results in columns (1) and (2) for the governance of tenure
decisions for each of the sixteen possible combinations of institution
type and affiliation. Starting in the top row, we see that administrators
in specialized institutions are very likely to have sole authority over
tenure decisions (probabilities in bold type) and that the probabilities
of administrator determination decrease as we proceed down the table,
whereas the probability that faculty will have exclusive authority over
tenure decisions increases (though only slightly and hardly at all be-
tween liberal arts colleges and universities), with the more conspicuous
increase occurring in the likelihood that tenure decisions will require
joint action. The effects of institutional affiliation are of comparable
magnitude: Authority for tenure decisions is substantially more likely
to rest with administrators in public and Catholic institutions than in
private ones. Comparing the extremes, administrators of specialized
public institutions are estimated to have at least veto power over tenure
decisions 99% of the time and full authority for tenure decisions with
a probability of 0.81, whereas faculty are predicted to have veto power
over tenure at a majority of private research universities. Although the
probability estimate for administrator determination is larger than that
for joint action, the likelihood that tenure decisions will require the
consent of both faculty and administrators is substantially higher at
private research universities than at most other institutions.
5.2.4 Alternative explanations
The literature contains few positive theories of either political or aca-
demic governance that yield competing hypotheses. The most promi-
nent economic theory of democracy, the preference aggregation or social
choice approach associated with the work of Arrow (1963), has empha-
sized the efficiency and stability properties of voting rules.32 Among that
32. Shepsle (1993, p. 349) identifies a third perspective or “school of thought” on
political governance—in addition to “status quo failure” (preference aggregation) and
“gains from trade” (commitment) schools—that emphasizes economizing on information
costs (see also Gilligan, 1993). Drawing on agency theory, this approach emphasizes the
“benefits to colocating decision authority with the knowledge that is valuable to those deci-
sions” (Jensen and Meckling, 1992, p. 253), and generally implies the allocation of authority
to individuals who have “accumulated substantial prior expertise or competency” or for
whom information is more important (Aghion and Tirole, 1997, p. 27; see also Baker et
al., 1999). Although this theory has potential implications for the assignment of authority
on specific decisions—for example, the assignment of hiring and promotion decisions
to faculty, and budget decisions to administrators—it does not appear to offer clear
predictions (separate from the commitment issues already discussed) for the variation
in governance between institutions that is the focus of this paper.
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literature’s best-known results is that, except where the decision space
is unidimensional—that is, where voters care only about a single policy
issue—any majority rule outcome is vulnerable to being overturned
by another proposal (see McKelvey, 1979; Schofield, 1978; Plott, 1967).
The prospect of instability and inefficiency, moreover, increase with the
dimensions of the policy space (e.g., Greenberg, 1979; Schofield, 1986).
Inasmuch as the number of issues (i.e., the dimensions of the decision
space) increases with the heterogeneity of a population, social choice
theory predicts a decrease in the performance, and hence attraction,
of democratic decision making in organizations with more heteroge-
neous members. Although the greater incidence of joint action (divided
democracy) relative to faculty determination (unified democracy) is
consistent with the adoption of executive veto or bicameral legislatures
as a structural remedy to the instability of majority rule (Hammond
and Miller, 1987), the overall preference for democratic over autocratic
governance in larger, more heterogeneous institutions exhibited in the
data would seem to contradict the central implication of social choice
theory.33
Finally, it is sometimes argued that faculty participation in uni-
versity governance simply reflects a faculty taste for control. If control
is a normal good, faculty demand for control would increase with
faculty earnings, implying more democratic governance at, for example,
elite, research universities than lower-ranked teaching colleges, and at
private than at public or religious institutions, as is observed in the data.
Putting aside such questions as whether faculty actually have a taste for
authority and how the shadow price of faculty time relates to faculty
income and attributes, a taste-for-control explanation fails, however,
to explain the observed preference for shared governance (joint action)
over exclusive faculty determination in more elite, private and research-
oriented institutions (βdu > 0) indicated by the multinomial results.
Taken as a whole, the set of predictions derived from the commitment
theory (summarized in Table I) yields the best overall correspondence
with the observed patterns of governance.
6. Conclusion
As a system of government, dictatorship has certain advantages. In
contrast to decision makers in democratic systems, autocrats have the
33. The addition of veto points through executive veto or a bicameral legislature
increases the likelihood that a voting equilibrium will exist but does not guarantee stability
or efficiency of voting outcomes (Hammond and Miller, 1987). The concerns of formal
social choice theory with heterogeneous voters and issues are also consistent with the
general perception that size and heterogeneity reduce the appeal of democratic decision
making by exacerbating conflict, protracting debate, and slowing responsiveness. See, for
example, Benham and Keefer (1991, p. 709).
678 Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
authority to act unilaterally and decisively in response to unfolding
events. The drawback of such discretion is the inability to commit to
intervening non-opportunistically; unconstrained authority weakens
the incentives of subordinates to invest in relationship-specific assets
(Williamson, 1985) and to acquire information needed to make informed
decisions (e.g., Aghion and Tirole, 1997) while increasing the return
to efforts aimed at influencing its application (Milgrom and Roberts,
1990). The conundrum of executive authority is how, in the absence
of effective third-party enforcement, an executive with unconstrained
authority can commit to intervening only where doing so yields joint
surpluses (Williamson, 1985, Ch. 6).
Increasingly, research on political institutions has come to view
democratic governance as a response to just this problem. According
to the theory, democracy enhances confidence in governmental policies
(relative to autocracy) by providing a decision rule for evaluating the
legitimacy of state actions that (i) is simple and readily verifiable (relative
to evaluating the actions themselves) and (ii) expands the set of interests
represented in those decisions. The larger the number of “veto points”
created by the decision rule, the more stable policies are likely to be.
This paper has sought to shed light on the factors affecting the use
of democratic governance by analyzing variations in the governance
of colleges and universities. Two findings of the analysis stand out.
The first is the greater tendency for democratic governance in general,
and joint administrator-faculty determination in particular, in large,
heterogeneous institutions. The second is the heavier reliance on ad-
ministrator determination in public and Catholic institutions than in
private colleges and universities. The first of these, in particular, chal-
lenges the conventional wisdom that size and heterogeneity seriously
encumber democratic decision making (see, e.g., Hansmann, 1988, p.
294; Benham and Keefer, 1991). Though size and heterogeneity undoubt-
edly complicate democratic decision making, the relevant question in
an institutional choice context is the effect of those attributes on the
efficiency of democracy relative to alternative ways of governing trans-
actions. The evidence on the governance of colleges and universities, at
least, is consistent with the proposition that the benefits of democratic
governance in facilitating coordination and deterring appropriation
in communities of heterogeneous, immobile individuals outweigh the
costs and inefficiencies of collective decision making in such settings.
The greater tendency toward autocratic governance in state and
Catholic-affiliated institutions is also consistent with commitment
considerations. Because democracy protects only enfranchised interests,
democratic rule will tend to diminish the credibility of institutional
commitments to external patrons on whom the institution or community
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may depend for resources or support. Where the interests of those who
provide resources and of those who would control their disbursement
diverge significantly, the supply of resources may depend on assigning
authority to an autocrat-agent chosen and controlled by the donors.
Though the findings of this paper bear directly only on the gov-
ernance of academic institutions, the hypotheses tested are extensions
of more general theories of political and economic organization, and
parallels in these broader areas are not difficult to find. The theory
predicts, for instance, that divided democracy would be the supe-
rior form of government in large, heterogeneous countries (like the
United States), while unified, parliamentary democracy, of the type
found in many European countries, should dominate in smaller, more
homogeneous nations. Parallels can also be found in the correlation
between “extramural” interests and autocratic governance, as in the
United States’ support for dictatorships in countries thought crucial to
preserving US interests during the Cold War or, more recently, Britain’s
noticeable ambivalence toward democracy in Hong Kong—until the
colony’s return to China became imminent and Britain’s interests turned
to preserving the status quo. For similar reasons, nations founded on
strong non-individualistic ideologies (such as communism in the former
Soviet Union or Maoist China) or fundamentalist religious beliefs (Iran
and the Sudan, in recent times) should be more likely to be ruled by
dictators. Countries may not choose their political institutions to fit their
circumstances but, if the theory is correct, countries fortunate enough
to have political institutions appropriate to their circumstances at a
given point in their history should, ceteris paribus, outperform those
whose political systems and economic and demographic conditions are
misaligned (cf Qian and Weingast, 1996).
Finally, differences in the need for internal commitment also
offer a plausible rationale for the relative infrequency of democratic
governance in business organizations. On one side, the existence of an
important class of external patrons—the firm’s owners—on whom the
organization is dependent for capital and whose interests—protection of
investments against appropriation by insiders and overall maximization
of long-run returns—may not align with the short-term interests of the
firm’s employees favors autocratic control. On the other is the poten-
tially greater availability of alternative employment opportunities in
commercial than academic settings—owing, in part, to the geographical
dispersion of universities (Brennan and Tollison, 1980, p. 349)—which
would tend to reduce the value of governance structures that enhance
internal commitment: As Holmstrom (1999) puts it, “the very fact that
workers can exit a firm at will and go to other firms, and that consumers
and input suppliers and other trading partners can do likewise, limits
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the firm’s ability to exploit these constituents [and] makes it feasible
for the firm to go about its business of setting ‘internal rules of the
game’ in a relatively unfettered fashion” (p. 90). However, even con-
ventional business firms, he adds, “feel . . . pressures to be democratic
and nonpartial when exit is costly for its members”: “Democracy is a
costly governance procedure, but it appears to be the best one available
when [as in the case of governments] exit is precluded” (id.). In fact,
though we tend to view the internal organization of firms as mono-
lithic, not all business entities are organized autocratically: Democratic
decisionmaking is the predominant form of governance in commercial
areas such as professional service partnerships; producer and consumer
cooperatives (some of which are large enough to appear in the Fortune
500 list of industrial corporations (Hansmann, 1988)); and commod-
ity and financial exchanges (Pirrong, 1999). The apparent success of
a commitment orientation in explaining the internal governance of
colleges and universities suggests a new direction for analyzing internal
governance of other organizations.
Appendix
The following are the category definitions and instructions used in
the survey published in the Report of the Survey Subcommittee of
Committee T (1971), AAUP Bulletin, Spring, pp. 69–124:
Determination. Determination means that the faculty of an
academic unit or its duly authorized representatives have
final legislative or operational authority with respect to
the policy or action, and any other technically required
approvals or concurrences are only pro forma. Please con-
sider actual practices followed.
Joint Action. Joint action means that formal agreement by
both the faculty and other components of the institution
is required for affirmative action or policy determination.
Negative action can be accomplished by a veto by any
component. The separate components need not act simul-
taneously but should act within a reasonable time interval.
In no case should the interval be longer than an academic
year.
Consultation. Consultation means that there is a formal pro-
cedure or established practice which provides a means
for the faculty (as a whole or through authorized rep-
resentatives) to present its judgment in the form of a
Why Universities Are Not Organized as Firms 681
recommendation, vote or other expression sufficiently
explicit to record the position or positions taken by the
faculty. This explicit expression of faculty judgment must
take place in time to affect the decision to be made.
Initiative for the expression of faculty judgment may come
from the faculty, the administration, or the board.
Discussion. Discussion means there is only an informal ex-
pression of opinion from the faculty or from individual
faculty members; or that there is formally expressed opin-
ion only from administratively selected committees.
None. None means that there is no faculty participation.
In ascertaining the form of a faculty participation in a
given academic unit (college, school, department) in a given
decision-making process, find that instance in which the level
of participation was least. The form of this instance is the form
of participation for that academic unit in the decision-making
process. In particular, all specific instances in the time period to be
covered for the specific question, through all decision levels without
a single exception, must be at least at the minimum participation
level indicated for that academic unit [emphasis is the original].
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